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Summary
Bernardino Telesio’s philosophy of  nature marked a momentous change in the 
philosophical panorama of  late Renaissance. By redefining the notion of  sentience 
(sensus) as the ability, inherent in the two principle forces of  the universe (heat and 
cold), to react and adapt to a reality in constant change, Telesio championed a view 
of  nature and man that radically departed from the principles of  Aristotle’s natural 
philosophy. In developing his new notion of  sentience, Telesio insisted on the aspects 
of  receptivity and awareness. Through the first, he stressed the primary role of  pneu-
matic matter (spiritus), understood as a thin, supple and swift vehicle capable of  ac-
counting for all material changes in the universe ; through the second, he raised the 
property of  self-perception to the level of  a universal natural property. This allowed 
him to replace the key Aristotelian concept of  unintentional teleology with the idea 
of  a self-organising power inherent in nature and to endow the material spirit with 
the ability to feel and react to all phenomena occurring in the universe (spiritus om-
niscius omnino). By relying on subtly discerning tendencies of  pursuit and avoidance, 
Telesio’s spirit was thus capable of  preserving life at all levels, both higher and lower, 
physical and ethical.
Francis Bacon’s representation of  Bernardino Telesio as the first of  the moderns is well known. His portrayal of  Telesio as the restorer of  
Parmenides’ philosophy proved to be influential as well. The reason that 
such an interpretation became so successful is that it epitomised the char-
acteristic tensions of  Telesio’s philosophy, especially his attempt to provide 
a radically new view of  nature whilst remaining faithful to very ancient 
systems of  thought. In the following centuries, Bacon’s reading became ex-
tremely popular in the annals of  history of  philosophy, perhaps too popular. 
As a result, Telesio remained frozen in his role of  the iconoclastic thinker 
who availed himself  of  the materialistic interpretation of  Eleatic monism 
in order to overturn the Aristotelian universe from its foundations. (To be 
fair, in this story one should also remember Francesco Patrizi, who played 
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a crucial role in the construction of  the Telesian myth, which, as any other 
myth, contains a certain amount of  truth). 
There is no doubt that Telesio’s attack on Aristotelian natural philoso-
phy was original and groundbreaking. However, it would be fair to say that 
his work remained deeply rooted in the hermeneutical situation of  Renais-
sance Aristotelianism and adhered to the characteristic scholastic formats 
of  the commentary and the quaestio (with its stringent successions of  objec-
tions and replies). This is not surprising if  we think that Telesio studied at 
Padua and that his trip to Brescia in 1563 to consult with Vincenzo Maggi 
– a renowned authority on Aristotelian matters at the time – wasn’t just a 
courtesy call.  Moreover, it is evident how Telesio decided to conduct his 
critique of  the Aristotelian worldview by producing a slow, word-by-word, 
almost parasitic appropriation of  the Aristotelian text (and the same could 
be said of  the relationship that connects Telesio’s medical tracts to the body 
of  Galenic works). Finally, a large part of  his materialistic reinterpretations 
of  key tenets of  Aristotelian philosophy relied on the recovery of  past doc-
trines. Leaving aside for the moment the Parmenidean affair, Telesio’s ar-
 F. Bacon, Thema coeli, in Philosophical Studies c. 1611-c.1619, ed. with introduction, notes 
and commentaries by G. Rees, transl. by G. Rees and M. Edwards, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1996, p. 128 ; Idem, De principiis atque originibus secundum fabulas Cupidinis et Coeli, in ibidem, 
pp. 224, 250-258. On Bacon’s attitude towards Telesio, see V. Giachetti Assenza, Bernardino 
Telesio. Il migliore dei moderni. I riferimenti a Telesio negli scritti di Francesco Bacone, « Rivista di 
Storia della Filosofia », xxxv, 1980, pp. 41-78 ; J.-C. Margolin, Bacon, lecteur critique d’Aristote et 
de Telesio, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi su Bernardino Telesio, Cosenza, Accademia 
Cosentina, 1990, pp. 135-166 ; E. De Mas, Bernardino Telesio e la falsità di Aristotele. Il giudizio 
di Bacone e di Tobia Adami, in ibidem, pp. 167-179. On Telesio and Parmenides, see : M. Muc-
cillo, La storia della filosofia presocratica nelle Discussiones Peripateticae di Francesco Patrizi 
da Cherso, « La Cultura », xiii, 1975, pp. 48-105 ; M.-P. Lerner, Le « Parménidisme » de Telesio. 
Origine et limites d’une hypothese, in Bernardino Telesio e la cultura napoletana, ed. by R. Sirri and 
M. Torrini, Naples, Guida, 1992, pp. 79-105 ; De Mas, Bernardino Telesio e la falsità di Aristotele, 
cit., pp. 176-178 ; R. Bondì, Bacon e la restaurazione di Parmenide, « Rivista di Filosofia », xcii, 
2001, pp. 327-339.
 Further evidence of  Bacon’s acumen in his interpretation is the acknowledgment of  the 
Aristotelian background in Telesio’s philosophy and Telesio’s ability to overturn the peri-
patetic system from within (« Vir Peripateticis rationibus (si aliquid illae essent) potens et 
instructus, quas etiam in illos ipsos vertit » (Bacon, De principiis atque originibus, cit., p. 224)). 
In Padua Telesio studied philosophy (under Gerolamo Amalteo), mathematics (under Fed-
erico Delfino), medicine and ‘perspective’. Cesare Vasoli emphasises the importance of  the 
Paduan experience in order to understand Telesio’s relationship with Aristole’s philosophy 
(C. Vasoli, Ragioni di un convegno, in Bernardino Telesio e la cultura napoletana, cit., pp. 497-
498). As pointed out by Charles Schmitt and Brian Copenhaver, Telesio happened to be in 
Padua when Vesalio was teaching anatomy and when the debate on the soul sparked off  by 
Pomponazzi’s philosophy reached its apex (B. P. Copenhaver and C. B. Schmitt, Renais-
sance Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 310). On Telesio’s appropriation of  
key Aristotelian tenets, see M.-P. Lerner, Aristote « oblieux de lui-même » selon Bernardino Telesio, 
« Les études philosophiques », n. 3, 1986, pp. 371-389. 
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senal of  philosophical arguments includes elements of  Presocratic hylozo-
ism and a certain penchant for a pre-Galenic and sometimes anti-Galenic 
Hippocratism (especially the Hippocrates of  De carnibus). Whilst I would 
be wary of  dismissing Dilthey’s old thesis that Stoicism (with its emphasis 
on reason embedded in nature and nature as embodied reason) played a sig-
nificant role in Telesio’s new philosophy of  nature,  I have no qualms about 
getting rid of  the thesis that Telesio’s ‘modernity’ depends on his alleged 
empiricism, or the thesis that he was not ‘modern’, or at least ‘not modern 
enough’, because he did not leave any room to mathematics in his system 
of  nature. 
1. From Aristotle’s unsentient nature to Telesio’s sentience 
of nature
To avoid getting caught in a quagmire of  conflicting interpretations, I will 
try to tackle the question from a different, safer angle. Everyone agrees 
that the most innovative aspect of  Telesio’s philosophy lies in his bold state-
ment concerning the autonomy of  nature – natura iuxta propria principia. 
But what is exactly ‘nature’ for Telesio ? It is safe to say that Telesio looked 
at nature as a self-sufficient system, based on the actions and reactions of  
two conflicting principles, heat and cold, which constantly try to get hold of  
the bodily bulk of  matter (corporea moles). The preservation of  the precari-
ous balance of  the universe (conservatio sui) results from the way in which 
heat and cold confront each other. The unremitting series of  conflicts and 
truces they go through follows the model of  physical change known in an-
tiquity as ‘antiperistasis’, that is, a system of  organised reactivity in which 
two or more forces manage to remain in a state of  tension by alternatively 
chasing and fleeing each other. Heat and cold do not act blindly and arbi-
trarily, nor are they instruments in the hand of  some omniscient power. In 
Telesio’s opinion, the self-regulatory mechanism is internal to nature and 
it corresponds to the active principle that he calls « sense » (sensus). There is 
 W. Dilthey, Weltanshauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation 
(Gesammelte Schriften, ii), Stuttgart and Goettingen, Teubner and Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1957, pp. 433-437. On Dilthey’s interpretation of  Telesio, see A. Orsucci, A proposito dell’inte-
resse di Dilthey per l’antropologia cinquecentesca, in Bernardino Telesio e la cultura napoletana, cit., 
pp. 417-425. A close reading of  Telesio’s work reveals that the presence of  Stoic themes and 
their role in shaping his thought cannot be downplayed. A few examples : the idea of  an all-
pervading, active and tenuous substance (spirit), the pneumatic and material nature of  the 
soul, the belief  in the rational order of  the universe, the concept of  a natural orientation to 
one’s own good (oikeiosis) and the notion of  virtue as a form of  knowledge.
 For recent studies on Telesio’s philosophy, see : L. De Franco, Introduzione a Bernardino 
Telesio, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1995 ; R. Bondì, Introduzione a Telesio, Rome and Bari, 
Laterza, 1997 ; M. Mulsow, Frühneuzeitliche Selbsterhaltung. Telesio und die Naturphilosophie der 
Renaissance, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1998.
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no need to look for an ideal craftsman (artifex) capable of  moderating the 
forces of  heat and cold according to the internal constitution of  natural 
beings.  As Tommaso Campanella would point out a few years later, the 
extent to which things can be said to be self-sufficient depends on their level 
of  sentience.  By providing a rigorous account of  the material universe and 
its phenomena based on the complementary notions of  nature, perception 
and self-preservation, Telesio managed to lay the foundation for a new vi-
sion of  natural autonomy.
In a very original way, Telesio’s notion of  sentience combines two almost 
opposite characteristics : material change and the awareness that accompa-
nies such a change. Telesio defines natural sentience as the ability inherent 
in the active natures (heat and cold) to recognise similarities and differenc-
es while they proceed to shape matter through movements of  pursuit and 
avoidance. Through a direct and unmediated recognition of  material reality 
that is based on a direct and unmediated perception of  their own identity, 
heat and cold strive for their self-preservation, knowingly and expediently. 
On the other hand, though, Telesio insists on the material and transforma-
tive character of  perception. Acts of  sentience are corporeal because first 
and foremost they presuppose physical reactions and corporeal assimila-
tions between subjects and objects of  knowledge. It does not come as too 
much of  a surprise, then, to learn that Telesio considered the sense of  touch 
to be the primary sense. Through acts of  recognition and assimilation, all 
sentient principles perceive and react to the material change wrought upon 
themselves. This means that Telesio does not confine the meaning of  pas-
sion to the condition of  being affected and acted upon by an external acting 
principle. Passion, in the context of  Telesio’s natural philosophy, signifies a 
process of  receptive suppleness that includes a dimension of  active response. 
We can therefore say that Telesio understands sensus as the primordial sense 
of  being affected pervading the entire universe. By being an intentional and 
purposive reaction, perception is not a condition of  passivity that remains 
at the level of  unconscious activity. All sentient beings « sense », « feel » the 
things that act upon them, delight in their contact every time they recognise 
a similarity of  nature and fight against them when they perceives a threat to 
their condition. As a synthesis of  recognition and transformation – that is, 
insofar as it is a vital passion – Telesio’s sensus is an undivided and seamless 
process in which feeling, appetite and motion mutate into each other.
 Citations from Telesio’s De rerum natura are from Luigi De Franco’s edition (Cosenza, 
Casa Del Libro, 1965-1974, vols i-ii  ; Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1976, vol. iii). De rerum natura, 
iv, 3 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 16). 
 On Campanella’s post-Telesian theory of  natural sentience, see G. Giglioni, Senso, lin-
guaggio e divinazione nella filosofia di Tommaso Campanella, « Rivista di Storia della Filosofia », 
lxiv, 2009, pp. 309-320.
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Being an intentional motion that aims towards increasing levels of  assimi-
lation compatible with the preservation of  the whole system, for Telesio a 
sensation is never a mechanical impression caused by external things. Ev-
ery natural being undergoing a sensation must necessarily be aware of  its 
own modifications and of  the actions that any other natural being can cause 
on it. Heat and cold perceive external things only insofar as they perceive 
themselves as being modified by the external things.  Unlike Aristotle, Tele-
sio does not think that the sentient faculty is actualised by the form of  the 
perceived thing, nor does he endorse the view that all acts of  sensation sim-
ply mirror an external world, unaffected by the perceptions of  the sentient 
principle. Sentient powers perceive the world by perceiving themselves af-
fected by the world.
From what has been said so far, it is clear that, as a synthesis of  mate-
rial change and active recognition, natural sentience implies a condition of  
awareness. Telesio’s sensus is fundamentally sensus sui and nature is accord-
ingly conscious nature. If  the autonomy of  nature relies on its being aware 
of  its own processes, can nature still be called ‘nature’ ? In the rest of  this 
essay, I will argue that Telesio could in fact describe nature as a self-sufficient 
and self-maintaining power because he looked at the universe as a system 
endowed with self-awareness. I will substantiate my argument, first, by ex-
amining Patrizi’s general criticisms of  Telesio’s natural philosophy, then, by 
dwelling on Telesio’s account of  the involuntary functions of  the body and, 
finally, by singling out the philosophical implications underlying his ethics 
of  self-preservation.
2. How Patrizi unveiled Telesio’s most recondite 
metaphysical assumptions
In his critical review of  Telesio’s philosophy, Patrizi did not miss the oppor-
tunity to lay bare the metaphysical implications underlying Telesio’s attack 
on Aristotle. According to Patrizi, far from relying only on the unmediated 
and unadulterated perception of  the senses, Telesio outlined a rather so-
phisticated and complex metaphysics of  the senses. His notion of  material 
sentience had both epistemological and ontological connotations. Believing 
that sensation could act as both a source and a foundation of  knowledge, he 
based the reliability of  reason and the intellect on the certainty provided by 
the senses. Indeed, for Telesio, reason and intellect were effete and decaying 
forms of  sensus.
It is especially when one examines Telesio’s account of  man’s higher cog-
nitive faculties that his belief  in the ontological primacy of  the senses comes 
 Ibidem, vii, 2 (ed. De Franco, iii, p. 6).
guido giglioni74
to the fore. He thought that, regardless of  whether one looks at knowledge 
as an adaptive and self-preserving activity evolving from an inner sense of  
touch or as an inferential skill that develops from increasingly more abstract 
functions of  the intellect, the fact remains that by perceiving external things 
a natural being perceives the whole life of  the universe, for from the very 
beginning a natural being is already furnished with the subtlest abilities and 
skills (ingenium).  The only difference between sense and intellect is one of  
degree, rather than of  nature. Knowledge in all its forms, both concrete and 
abstract, originates from a direct material contact with reality, i.e., from a 
corporeal immersion into the sentient life of  the universe. By contrast, the 
knowledge provided by the intellect, with its tortuous path of  mediations 
and comparisons, lacks the vigour and adroitness that characterise the op-
erations of  sensus.
Patrizi mistook Telesio’s notion of  self-aware and self-organising sen-
tience for an expression of  tacit and undigested Platonism. He remained 
convinced that a chasm divided the senses from the intellect, and that only 
the power of  the intellect, acting from above, could spread the light of  in-
tentional knowledge through an otherwise inanimate world of  inert mat-
ter. By contrast, Telesio believed that material sentience in itself  had the 
power of  unifying the parts of  the universe through recurrent patterns of  
actions and reactions, mediating between the whole and the parts, between 
the past, the present and the future, the visible and the invisible, causes and 
effects.  In this perspective, the intellect represented a more developed form 
of  sentient perception, through which higher organisms were better suited 
to meet their complex needs. There was, therefore, no need to rely on a 
universal faculty supervising nature – a soul of  the world – for nature, being 
the original repository of  sensus, does not need intellect, memory, or imagi-
nation to be guided in its operations. This is a very important point, which 
is worth bearing in mind every time one is confronted with the question of  
Telesio’s anthropomorphism and animism.
One could say that Patrizi was right in arguing that Telesio’s physics of  
sentient spirit was, in fact, a metaphysics of  natural perception. Also, one 
may assume that Telesio and Patrizi would in the end agree that the ulti-
mate principle governing nature was reason, provided that by « reason » they 
meant the ability inherent in all natural beings to choose what is conducive 
to their self-preservation. Finally, Patrizi was probably right in objecting to 
Telesio that mere degrees of  heat and cold could never result in the forma-
 On the notion of  ingenium in a Telesian context, see A. Persio, Trattato dell’ingegno del-
l’huomo, ed. by L. Artese, Pisa and Rome, Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, 1999, 
p. 27.
 Antiperistasis and horror vacui, reinterpreted according to the notion of  adaptive sen-
tience, are key notions in Telesio’s physics.
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tion of  individual things and in the production of  their innumerable dis-
tinguishing features. However, he missed Telesio’s fundamental point that 
the sentient activity of  nature could not be understood simply as a material 
change mechanically impressed on the sense organs by external objects, or 
as a reflection of  Platonic ideas preserved in nature in a state of  latent vir-
tuality. For Telesio, natural sentience was the very activity promoted by the 
forces of  heat and cold in their constant attempts to give shape and struc-
ture to the world.
In all likelihood, Patrizi’s review of  De rerum natura stimulated Telesio’s 
speculative acumen. In the last edition of  the work, published in 1586, he 
gives the impression that he took Patrizi’s objections seriously. He fleshed 
out the notion of  a teleological disposition to being affected by and respond-
ing to external things inherent in nature and presented such disposition as 
the foundation of  the material universe. He unambiguously characterised 
sentience as the metaphysical rationale behind the homeostatic balance of  
the universe. The vicissitudes of  the sentient spirit, especially in the way 
they are described in the last books of  De natura rerum – i.e., as resulting 
from an inherently restless substance, thrown into the jail of  matter (i.e., 
the bodily tegument), from which it strives to free itself  and rejoin the heav-
en, its original abode – resonate with Platonic echoes, while maintaining 
strong naturalistic traits. Campanella – much more open to Platonic sug-
gestions than Telesio – would bear in mind such a Platonic rereading in es-
pousing the doctrine of  the anima mundi and articulating his metaphysics of  
the primal attributes of  being (primalitates).  But what Telesio seems to have 
accomplished in a more straightforward manner than Campanella would 
do was to show that the distinctions between souls and nature, on the one 
hand, and between nature and matter, on the other, were not as neatly spec-
ified as both Plato and Aristotle had thought. This key point becomes more 
evident when we examine Telesio’s medical explanations concerning the 
involuntary operations of  the body. 
3. Anatomy and the scope of the involuntary functions
Telesio’s belief  that the universe is governed by intentional knowledge in 
the form of  a sentient, discerning and adaptive tendency, and not by nature 
 T. Campanella, Philos. sens. dem., ed. by L. De Franco, p. 40 : « anima mundi, quam Tel-
esius praetermisit ». On Campanella’s changing views about Telesio’s notion of  nature, see 
M.-P. Lerner, Telesio et Campanella : De la nature iuxta propria principia à la nature instrumen-
tum Dei, « Bruniana & Campanelliana », xiii, 2007, pp. 79-97. On Campanella’s primalities, see 
G. Giglioni, Primalità, « Bruniana & Campanelliana », xiv, 2008, pp. 95-106.
 On Patrizi as an interpreter of  Telesio’s natural philosophy, see A. L. Puliafito, La fisica 
telesiana attraverso gli occhi di un contemporaneo : Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, in Bernardino Telesio 
e la cultura napoletana, cit., pp. 257-270.
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(understood, in an Aristotelian sense, as a principle of  unintentional teleol-
ogy) also recurs in his anatomical explanations. Here Telesio is concerned 
with the role of  what he calls « sentient substance », that is, the entire reserve 
of  spirituous matter circulating within the nervous network (universitas spir-
itus) and distributed by the nerves throughout the body starting from the 
ventricles of  the brain, where the spirit is located for the most part. Telesio 
calls the whole system of  nervous ramifications carrying the spirit, includ-
ing the brain, the nervous system (genus nervosum). In contrast with both 
the Aristotelian notion of  vegetative soul and the Galenic doctrine of  the 
natural faculties – a view that, according to Telesio, relies on the assumption 
that there may be a kind of  substance that is « dull and completely devoid 
of  knowledge » (bruta cognitionisque omnis expers substantia)  – Telesio argues 
that there is no qualitative distinction between animal (voluntary) and nat-
ural (involuntary) actions in the body because, first, the soul – which for 
Telesio is the same thing as the material spirit – is one and not divided into 
many faculties, and, second, because the spirit is all sentient, and must be so 
in order to be able to perform such delicate and complex operations as the 
heartbeat, respiration, nutrition, attraction, secretion and excretion.  As in 
the greater body of  the universe all material changes result from processes 
of  condensation and rarefaction regulated by the forces of  sentient cold and 
heat, so in the lesser body of  human beings the contractions and expansions 
of  the fi bres are governed by the ratio of  the whole spirit (summa et ipsae [...] 
operantur ratione).  Telesio argues that the spirit must be thin, supple and 
continuous in order to move fast and transmit the directions imparted by 
the « sentient and intelligent » substance. As it is often the case with Telesio, 
a fine line divides the sphere of  vital and sentient operations from that of  
the material characteristics of  the vehicle. 
 B. Telesio, Quod animal universum ab unica animae substantia gubernatur, in Idem, Varii de 
naturalibus rebus libelli, ed. by L. De Franco, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1981, p. 209.
 Telesio, De rerum natura, v, 12, 14 (ed. De Franco, ii, pp. 278, 282, 292). The sentient 
nature of  the spirit is such that, by perceiving individual objects, it perceives the whole uni-
verse (« quae sentit, universa ea simul sentiat omnia »). The perception of  the spirit govern-
ing the body is universal and flawless : « Itaque, ut dictum est, quod spiritus portionum, cui 
reliquarum passiones rerumque omnium vires et reliquae percipiendae sunt condiciones, 
motuumque, quibus a singulis commotus est, memoria cognitioque servanda retinendaque 
est ; et ex iis remotarum et praesentium etiam, at quarum non omnes condiciones manifestae 
sunt, quae latent intelligendae sunt omnes ; et modus insuper, quo, quae spiritus portiones 
patiuntur, mala reiciantur, et quibus opus habent, comparentur, motus nimirum inveniendi 
sunt, quibus illa omnia peragantur ; et singulae spiritus portiones iis commovendae ; denique 
quia reficiendae sunt omnes : utique spiritus universitas ejusmodi sedi itaque constructae, 
cujusmodi cerebrum est, et quomodo cerebrum constructum videtur, et cerebro omnino 
indenda fuit ».  Ibidem, v, 14 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 296).
 Ibidem, v, 13 (ed. De Franco, ii, pp. 286-288). Telesio acknowledges that the communi-
cation between the universitas of  the spirit in the brain and the portions of  spirit scattered
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Telesio objects to Galen that a ‘natural’ (i.e., involuntary and vegetative) 
action, if  there is any such action, should constantly follow the same pat-
tern and should behave according to the same ratio because it is nature’s 
prerogative to persist indefinitely, unknowingly and unflinchingly in the un-
dertaken path. Any deviation from it would represent an arbitrary or vio-
lent modification of  a teleologically determined course of  action. However, 
in Telesio’s view, such an inflexible necessity would not be compatible with 
the flexible and fallible nature of  the vital economy of  the body. All pro-
cesses, even the simplest ones, involve a certain amount of  modifications 
and adjustments to varying conditions, both internal or external. Such an 
ability to change in response to internal and external variations – what Tele-
sio calls the ratio vivendi – implies the ability to abandon the usual path and 
to start the formation of  new habits. In other words, it involves knowledge 
and choice, something that is categorically excluded by the Aristotelian and 
Galenic notions of  vegetative soul and natural faculty. In Telesio’s opinion, 
what at first sight seems to be natural and involuntary, on closer inspection 
is, in fact, the outcome of  a learning process and the establishment of  a suc-
cessful custom – a type of  action that presupposes at the beginning a clear 
act of  knowledge. 
In Telesio’s anatomy, therefore, it is the soul, and not nature, that is the 
principle of  bodily life. Of  course, by ‘soul’ Telesio means a corporeal, sen-
tient and knowing spirit, and not an immaterial form (as in Aristotle), nor 
a specific disposition resulting from a balanced combination of  corporeal 
qualities and humors (as is the case with Galen’s temperament). Telesio’s 
soul is the result of  an integrated system of  myriad interconnected opera-
tions, and not a set of  vital levels hierarchically nested within each other 
(nutrition, sense, appetite and intellect, to follow the main stages in life ac-
cording to Aristotle’s theory of  the soul). The organic, unified and seamless 
activity of  the soul is not determined by the unity of  a formal principle ; 
throughout the body is a phenomenon that is longe obscurissimum (De rerum natura, v, 14 (ed. 
De Franco, ii, pp. 298-300)).
 Ibidem, v, 13 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 286) ; v, 24 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 350). See also ibidem, iv, 
28 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 192) (where Telesio infers the sun’s summa cognitio and summa ratio 
from its ability to interrupt, increase and diminish its power) ; Idem, Quod animal universum 
ab unica animae substantia gubernatur, cit., pp. 214-218. It is worth remembering that Giovanni 
Alfonso Borelli’s explanation of  the heartbeat as the result of  an original learning process on 
the soul’s part, a process that in time becomes a habit and that only apparently (or perhaps 
only partially) is mechanical and involuntary, seems to derive from this tradition of  sentient 
naturalism (to be sure, through the mediation of  Campanella) rather than from Descartes’ 
programme of  mechanistic anatomy. See G. A. Borelli, De motu animalium, 2 vols., Rome, 
1680-1681, ii, pp. 153-157. See G. Giglioni, The Machines of  the Body and the Operations of  the 
Soul in Marcello Malpighi’s Anatomy, in Marcello Malpighi. Anatomist and Physician, ed. by D. 
Bertoloni Meli, Florence, Olschki, 1997, p. 173.
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rather, it depends on the entire system of  spirituous matter channelled along 
a network of  vessels and constantly running throughout the body. Telesio’s 
redefinition of  the vital economy of  the body has a series of  important con-
sequences : it debunks the main assumption underlying Aristotelian natu-
ralism (i.e., the existence of  an all-encompassing and purposeful natural 
agency), it shifts the emphasis from Galen’s temperamentum to the soul, and, 
finally, it makes the soul a particular case of  the universal sentience of  the 
cosmos. Knowledge (summus sensus and summa cognitio) is diffused all over 
the body, in the form of  a faculty that is capable of  both judgment and will.  
That each single part is able to perform its own specific functions smoothly 
and forcefully, and – what is even more astonishing – in perfect agreement 
with the actions of  all the other parts, depends on the fact that the whole 
system of  sentient spirit located in the brain acts as a fully-fledged knowing 
subject, acquainted with everything occurring in both the body and the cos-
mos. Telesio’s thesis is indeed astonishing, but the rigour of  his philosophi-
cal demonstrations mitigates the strikingly bold move of  postulating a fully 
aware material spirit acting in nature.
4. Sensus, sapientia and spiritus omniscius
The study of  the human body and its vital functions demonstrates that 
the universitas spiritus has the ability to accommodate the organism to the 
changes of  its environment in the best possible way, for it knows what needs 
to be modified in order to preserve a balanced interplay between inward and 
outward changes. In contrast to the Hippocratic, Aristotelian and Galenic 
view of  nature as a power that uniformly and relentlessly accomplishes all 
the ends it has in view (provided that matter is not too recalcitrant), and that 
in so doing it contributes to the general order of  the universe, Telesio insists 
on the aspects of  contingency, mutability and uncertainty through which 
the sentient spirit responds and adapts to the varying circumstances of  an 
ever changing world. In each situation and at the right moment, within the 
system of  antiperistaltic actions and reactions created by the forces of  heat 
and cold, the spirit finds the appropriate means to maintain the overall bal-
ance.
Here Telesio identifies another crucial difference between Aristotle’s and 
his own system. In Aristotle’s philosophy, natural powers cannot act dif-
ferently from the way they do because the many possibilities of  material 
development are determined by an unstoppable tendency to be actualized 
by their corresponding forms, and therefore there is no need of  cognitive 
 Telesio, Quod animal universum ab unica animae substantia gubernatur, cit., p. 228 ; Idem, 
De rerum natura, v, 14 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 292). See ibidem, v, 16 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 304) : 
« Neque enim, nisi partibus insit omnibus, omnium necessitates percipiat ».
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principles or souls to regulate the process of  actualisation ; which means 
that, when the potentiality of  a natural power is fully developed and no 
obstacle intervenes, such development, the end result comes about as a nec-
essary outcome. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle had explained that, while ra-
tional powers have the flexibility to choose between contrarieties and are 
therefore able to act in opposite directions, natural powers can only be de-
termined in one direction.  Telesio’s view introduces a crucial difference : 
the ability to discriminate between alternatives is embedded in the primal 
motions of  nature, i.e., the cold’s and heat’s tendencies respectively to con-
tract and to expand. The active natures modify their operations according 
to the ever changing circumstances of  the whole system of  antiperistaltic 
actions and reactions, and therefore they need to be sentient and intentional 
powers. In the key notion of  self-preservation, Telesio’s emphasis is on the 
‘self ’ ; all the more so because heat, cold and the sentient spirit do not act 
driven by self-interest or immediate pleasure, but are provided with the abil-
ity to know what is the best option for them (i.e., self-preservation), to defer 
immediate gratification and to tolerate a certain amount of  pain in view of  
a greater advantage. 
Telesio can therefore identify the cognitive power of  the active natures 
with their virtue. Spirits are virtuous because « they know what operations 
they need to perform in order to preserve and perfect themselves ».  In con-
tributing to the best disposition of  the world, they act ‘morally’. Since spirit 
is a mixture of  heat and matter, its specific virtue (that is, the degree of  
knowledge with which it is endowed) depends on the way in which heat 
takes possession of  matter and deals with the antagonistic principle of  cold. 
Telesio defines virtue as corporeal knowledge, i.e., both a natural force and 
a material quality, a property that, in the final analysis, coincides with the 
degree of  warmth, subtlety and purity contained in the matter of  the spir-
its. This is in line with Telesio’s belief  that heat, motion and sense share the 
same active and purposive nature. Virtue is the spirit’s ability to intensify 
or restrain its own actions and passions in order to preserve its own nature, 
and by preserving itself, the spirit contributes to the preservation of  the 
universe.
It is no wonder, then, that in Telesio’s list of  virtues, sapientia ranks as 
the most important. Telesio characterises sapientia as « the intelligent fac-
ulty that is in command of  and tries to perceive the nature and the forces 
 Aristotle, Metaphysica, ix, 1 ; Physica, viii, 1, 251ab.
 On the Stoic concept of  self-preservation, see : G. Striker, The Role of  oikeiosis in Stoic 
Ethics, « Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy », i, 1983, pp. 145-168 ; B. Inwood, Ethics and Hu-
man Action in Early Stoicism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984 ; A. A. Long, Stoic Studies, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of  California Press, 1996, pp. 250-263.
 Telesio, De rerum natura, viii, 36 (ed. De Franco, iii, p. 328).
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of  all things and to understand those which cannot be perceived ; in short, 
it is a faculty that has the power to understand ».  In his treatment of  the 
principal virtues, Telesio relies on the common definition of  sapientia. « The 
wise man is the one who has investigated the nature and the forces of  all 
things », he says in De rerum natura ;  however, as Campanella will point out 
in a perfect Telesian spirit, sapere means, first and foremost, « to savor », « to 
have sense and discernment » and, accordingly, « to be sensible ».  The practi-
cal knowledge of  the world – the virtue of  wisdom – is rooted in the cor-
poreal sense, i.e., in the embodied knowledge that organises and governs 
the universe. Nature, understood as the Aristotelian unsentient power that 
actualises the virtual dispositions of  matter out of  a teleological necessity, 
is once again rejected. 
In this case, too, the linchpin of  Telesio’s ethical doctrine is strikingly 
bold. It is based on the assumption that the spirit is aware of  everything 
(omniscius omnino). In order to be up to its task of  promoting the self-pres-
ervation of  the universe, the spirit must perceive the nature and power of  
all things, deduce the experiences and events it cannot perceive in a direct 
way, remember everything that has happened in the past and foresee future 
developments. It has the ability to react to every single thing and to adjust 
itself  to the constantly changing conditions of  the universe.  One might 
say that the whole amount of  knowledge and spirituous matter scattered 
in the universe is constantly affected by a powerful ‘butterfly effect’. The 
omniscient sapientia inherent in nature represents the metaphysical foun-
dation of  the universal condition of  antiperistaltic reactivity. When Telesio 
says that everything in the universe has the ability to be affected (nihil enim 
apud nos impatibile est), he is attaching an active meaning to the word passio.  
Telesio is reversing Aristotle again : far from being a condition ontologically 
 De rerum natura, ix, 5 ; ed. De Franco, iii, p. 352.
 Ibidem. On Telesio’s ethical naturalism, see F. W. Lupi, Il sublime secondo Telesio, in Atti del 
Convegno Internazionale di Studi su Bernardino Telesio, cit., pp. 47-63.
 Campanella, Senso delle cose 2007, pp. 108-109.
 Telesio’s notion of  spiritus omniscius as an expression of  the inherent sapientia of  the uni-
verse is similar to Agostino Doni’s concept of  a primus sensus. See Doni, De natura hominis, 
Basel, Froben, 1581, f. 104 : « Quam quidem sui ipsius statusque sui abditam in se intellectio-
nem esse quoque sensus, atque adeo primum sensum, iure opinor aliquis dicere posset, et ex 
intentione in sese fieri atque constare ». On Doni, see L. De Franco, L’eretico Agostino Doni. 
Medico e filosofo del ’500, Cosenza, Pellegrini, 1973.
 Telesio, De rerum natura, ix, 6 (ed. De Franco, iii, pp. 358-360).
 Ibidem, iv, 20 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 134). Telesio criticises Aristotle for having denied the 
first principle the ability to be affected : see ibidem, iv, 3 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 14) ; iv, 8 (ed. De 
Franco, ii, p. 38). See Campanella, Senso delle cose, cit., p. 12 and especially p. 35, with referen-
ce to matter, (« sendo passione il senso, e la materia nata a patire, è attissima a sentire ») and p. 
112 (« chi è più passibile e molle, più è atto a sentire e diventar savio, e chi è duro manco pate 
e bisogno ha di sapienza »).
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inferior to activity and actuality, the disposition to be affected is the real 
source of  the life of  the universe.
Paradoxical as it may seem, Telesio’s ethical views reinforce his thesis that 
all natural operations postulate a condition of  primordial awareness, for in 
the domain of  ethics more than anywhere else, Telesio makes clear that the 
notion of  nature presupposes, in fact, a fully developed consciousness, i.e., 
a truly omniscient power, capable of  representing the whole universe, both 
in its spatial and its temporal dimensions. As an ethical power, even more 
than as a cosmological power and a physiological agent, nature proves to be 
a fully-fledged intentional and voluntary subject, a true ‘self ’.
5. Nature’s apparent autonomy in Aristotle’s philosophy
Telesio’s De rerum natura provides a systematic account of  the world, start-
ing from the original forces of  the universe up to the most sublime deeds 
that make human nature the pinnacle of  nature. It is a picture in which the 
progress of  ethical life develops as a natural consequence from the life of  
the material spirit. For this reason, the concluding stages in Telesio’s system 
of  nature prove to be of  decisive importance to understand better how bat-
tling forces of  heat and cold operate. 
In Telesio’s opinion, Aristotle’s notion of  nature shows all its limitations 
when one examines his concept of  motion. Aristotle claimed that motion 
represented « a kind of  life for everything that is constituted by nature », a 
« deathless and never failing property » belonging to all things.  What Telesio 
criticises of  this notion of  motion is that the underlying Aristotelian idea of  
nature as an internal principle of  activity is, in fact, a contradictory concept. 
It is true that in Aristotle’s philosophy nature is supposed to be a radically 
internal source of  change ; in fact, though, Aristotle ended up by defending 
the thesis that any change in the universe derives from something outside 
nature that does not belong to nature itself, and this in order to avoid the un-
welcome consequence that the motion of  nature, being intrinsically teleo-
logical, may derive from an internal and autonomous source of  knowledge. 
Natural motions are purposeful, but their directions do not depend on the 
actual knowledge of  the purposes possessed by the natural agent, but on 
the inescapable tendency to be actualised that characterise all nature beings. 
On the contrary, Telesio is firmly convinced that things are able to move 
precisely because from time to time they perceive and interact with other 
 Luigi De Franco rightly emphasised the revolutionary aspect of  Telesio’s ethical doc-
trines. See his La prima vera rivoluzione in filosofia : Bernardino Telesio, in Idem, Filosofia e scienza 
in Calabria nei secoli xvi e xvii, Cosenza, Edizioni Periferia, 1988, p. 101.
 Aristotle, Physica, viii, 1, 250b ; tr. by P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, Cambridge 
(Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1935, p. 269.
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things, with their natures and the surrounding environment ; they move 
away from them when they are bothered by them, they get closer to them 
when they recognise a similarity of  nature. In other words, Telesio rules out 
the possibility that natural motion may be separated from knowledge. Nat-
ural beings move not because of  an impersonal and unintentional actualisa-
tion caused by external and unmovable forms (regardless of  whether these 
forms are the natural places in the case of  inanimate beings or the souls in 
the case of  animate beings). Beings move (they move themselves, and are 
not moved by something else, Telesio reaffirms criticising Aristotles’s solu-
tion as a merely verbal trick)  because of  and according to their perception 
of  reality. It is because of  this cognitive tendency that the iron is attracted 
to the magnet, i.e., because it feels such a similarity of  nature between its 
heat and the heat of  the magnet that it is able to overcome the heaviness of  
its constitution, « to which it normally succumbs if  it is not stimulated by 
any desire ». (The same thing happens when the spirits of  the animals are 
aroused by vehement desires.) 
According to Aristotle, each element is characterized by the tendency to 
move towards its proper place and to remain at rest in that place once the 
motion is fully actualised. Everything that moves is moved by something 
else : the elements are moved by their respective natural places, the senses 
by the sensed object, the animal by its environment and the very purpose 
of  its action ; the whole universe, finally, is moved by the unmovable mover. 
Telesio demonstrates that, by advocating such a view of  natural motion, Ar-
istotle necessarily reached the conclusion that « things that move in a natural 
way are not moved by themselves and in virtue of  their own nature, but 
as a result of  another nature, distinct and separate from them ».  For Tele-
sio, Aristotle’s thesis of  nature as an internal principle of  motion cannot 
be reconciled with his other thesis that everything that moves is moved by 
something else. The consequence, Telesio concludes, is that Aristotle made 
the various « natures » and « forms » of  things « inert and lazy ».  Having been 
deprived of  the knowledge of  their purposes, natural beings lose the spon-
taneity of  their motions and the control over their actions. What is more 
– says Telesio adding a further objection – Aristotle reduced the motion of  
the natural elements to an accidental property by describing it sometimes 
as a consequence of  the so-called « generating principle » and some other 
times as a mechanical effect resulting from the release of  a previous tension 
or from the removal of  an obstacle. 
 Telesio, De rerum natura, iv, 21 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 139).
  Ibidem, iv, 23 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 156).
 Ibidem, iv, 20 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 130).
 Ibidem, iv, 20 (ed. De Franco, ii, pp. 132-134).
 Ibidem, iv, 20 (ed. De Franco, ii, pp. 128-130).
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By now, Telesio’s critical remarks directed at an Aristotelian universe 
populated with inactive natural forms should not come as too much of  
a surprise. However, it is not only the assumption of  an external source 
of  motion that, in his opinion, looms large in the Aristotelian explanatory 
framework. On a broader level, it is the very existence of  motion and the 
reality of  activity to be threatened. In Aristotle’s cosmology, all elements 
reach their actuality, that is, their perfection, when they rest in their proper 
place : full activity is the activity of  rest (and, in this respect, the ultimate 
perfection lie in the unmovable mover). By contrast, in Telesio’s cosmology 
each active nature constantly pours out of  its own boundaries and tries hard 
to invade the sphere of  action of  the other competing nature. In this case, 
perfection lies in a perpetually unresolved tension and not in actualized rest. 
While the unintentional teleology of  nature that governs Aristotle’s uni-
verse reflects the impersonal character of  the unmovable mover, unrest and 
appetite are the very hallmark of  Telesio’s universe.
There is, however, a further, deeper reason why Aristotle ruled out the 
possibility that natural beings could be seen as self-movers. His argument 
was that there had to be a clear distinction between the ‘moved’ and the 
‘mover’. Likewise, natural beings devoid of  a sensitive soul were not able 
to perceive themselves and reach the level of  sentient awareness, for the 
distinction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, like 
the distinction between the moving and the moved being, presupposed the 
ontological difference between a state of  potential change and its actualised 
form. In Aristotle’s metaphysics of  sublunar life, no natural thing could be 
agent and patient at the same time and in the same respect. As is well known, 
Aristotle argued that « in so far as it is a natural unity, nothing is acted upon 
by itself ; because it is one, and not a separate thing ».  Aristotle’s nature was 
no self-moving, self-active, certainly no self-perceiving entity. Indeed, nature 
in Aristotelian terms was by definition unable to perceive, while sentience 
belonged to a different ontological level. In the Aristotelian division of  nat-
ural powers and souls, the motion of  the elements towards their natural 
places, the processes of  nutrition, growth and reproduction, and finally the 
growth in sense awareness from the primordial manifestations of  appetitive 
life represented three distinct degrees of  actualisation which could not be 
bridged, nor could they overlap in any way. The fulfilment of  the virtual 
dispositions of  matter, the assimilation of  the form of  food and the ability 
to receive the form of  perceived things without their matter were three dif-
ferent stages in a process leading to increasing levels of  disembodiment. It 
is true that, for Aristotle, perception, like natural motion, was just another 
 Aristotle, Metaphysica, ix, 1, 1046a ; tr. by H. Tredennick, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard 
University Press, 1933, p. 431.
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instantiation of  the unremitting actualisation of  potentiality through which 
the life of  the universe was constantly preserving itself. However, unlike 
natural motion, perception presupposed an even more clear-cut division 
between the acting principle (i.e., the knowing form) and the acted upon 
substratum (i.e., the corporeal change brought about in the organ of  per-
ception by the sensory material).
To recapitulate, then, we might say that, whereas Aristotle explained all 
natural movements as a result of  the unintentional process of  actualisation 
pervading the universe, Telesio conflated the very notions of  movement 
and perception by defending the existence of  a natural and sentient appetite 
of  self-preservation in each part of  the universe. By shifting the focus from 
nature to sentience, Telesio set out to dismantle the very foundations of  
the Aristotelian natural world. He dramatically transformed the traditional 
categories of  nature and soul by introducing a notion of  sentient self hood 
that could be applied to both nature and man. Most of  all, by replacing the 
distinctively Aristotelian notion of  unintentional teleology with a principle 
of  sentient intentionality diffused everywhere in nature, Telesio rejected a 
deterministic view of  natural change based on the purposive (and yet unin-
tentional) fulfilment of  natural potentialities. Instead, he introduced a more 
flexible picture of  the physical universe in which the ability to survive and 
adapt to a world ruled by forms of  vital expansions could escape the pres-
sure of  a teleological plan.
6. Conclusion
Eager to present Telesio as the herald of  new developments in the field of  
seventeenth-century physics (and maybe led astray by Bacon’s own mod-
ernist rhetoric), historians of  early modern philosophy have in the past 
downplayed the role that natural sentience plays in Telesio’s view of  nature 
or have dismissed the very notion of  natural sentience as a residue of  out-
moded animism.  However, if  we want to understand the original charac-
ter of  Telesio’s position, we cannot pass over his theory of  an all-sentient 
spirit (spiritus omniscius omnino) or ignore those passages in which he unam-
biguously vindicates the existence of  sense and appetite in natural beings. 
Modern explanations of  heat and matter have often come to the rescue of  
historians who feel uncomfortable with Telesio’s omniscient spirit. Other 
interpreters have pointed to his defence of  knowledge through the senses 
as a manifesto of  modern empiricism. By rediscovering nature and the sens-
es, some have argued, Telesio prefigured the movement towards objective 
 G. Saitta, Il pensiero italiano nell’umanesimo e nel rinascimento, Florence, Sansoni, 1961, 
iii, p. 11 ; P. O. Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of  the Renaissance, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1964, p. 107 ; Copenhaver and Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, cit., p. 313.
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representations of  nature characteristic of  the scientific revolution – not to 
mention the way he allegedly prefigured the Newtonian concepts of  space 
and time by rejecting Aristotelian notions of  place and change. 
Nobody can deny that such a return to die Sachen selbst represents an in-
tegral part of  Telesio’ programme – « we have followed sense and nature, 
nothing else » (sensum videlicet nos et naturam, aliud praeterea nihil sequti su-
mus), he says indeed in the proem to his main work.  However, nature could 
also mean something else at the time, as Telesio knew very well. The tech-
nical meaning of  nature, so to speak, still referred, first and foremost, to the 
Aristotelian internal source of  motion and unsentient principle of  order. 
Such a principle represented the defining characteristic of  Aristotle’s natu-
ralism, different from both the Democritean concept of  material necessity 
and the Platonic notion of  self-motion. No doubt, the long series of  inter-
preters who through the centuries espoused Aristotle’s model of  natural 
philosophy testifies to the explanatory success of  the Aristotelian notion of  
unintentional teleology over Democritus’ non-purposive determinism and 
Plato’s intentional teleology. Theoretically speaking, though, the Aristote-
lian notion of  nature suffered from an ineliminable residue of  Platonism, 
in that all natural beings, in their irresistible tendency to be actualized by 
the form, appeared to be drawn to a principle that in the end transcended 
nature itself, regardless of  whether that principle was the unmoveable mov-
er, the pure actuality of  the ultimate form or the active intellect. Put in a 
nutshell, the actions of  nature were supposed to terminate in something 
other than nature itself. Telesio challenged this view on two levels : first, he 
dismissed the notion of  nature as an unconscious source of  activity by em-
phasizing instead its fully sentient character ; second, he demonstrated that 
the view of  unintentional finalism was a pure abstraction of  the intellect, 
for nature could not be regarded as occupying an autonomous sphere of  
activity without adding the decisive qualification that it has to be aware of  
its ends and purposes.
 The ghost of  Newton hovers over the interpretations of  Ernst Cassirer (Das Erkenntni-
sproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenshaft der neuren Zeit, Berlin, Bruno Cassirer, 1911-1920, 
i, pp. 232-240), P. O. Kristeller (Eight Philosophers of  the Italian Renaissance, cit., pp. 103-105), 
Giuseppe Martano (La “svolta” telesiana nella storia dei concetti di spazio e tempo, in Bernardino 
Telesio nel 4° centenario della morte (1588), Naples, Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento 
Meridionale, 1989, pp. 71-101), Karl Schuhmann (Le concept d’espace chez Telesio, in Bernardino 
Telesio e la cultura napoletana, cit., pp. 141-167). I tend to believe that Telesio’s idea of  space as a 
substantial disposition to receive and contain all natural things is the distinguishing trait of  an 
all-sentient cosmos rather than an anticipation of  the Newtonian notion of  objective space. 
See Tommaso Cornelio, De circumpulsione Platonica, in Progymnasmata physica, Venice, F. 
Baba, 1663, p. 322 : « Bernardinus Telesius [...] ratus est posse in rerum natura existere spatium 
omnis corporeae substantiae expers atque ideo prorsus inane, quanquam id non sine vi co-
natuque aliquo fieri posse contendit ».
 Telesio, De rerum natura, i, ‘Proemium’ (ed. De Franco, i, p. 28).
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However, by replacing the peripatetic notion of  unintentional teleol-
ogy with the concept of  universal sentience, Telesio inevitably exposed 
himself  to charges of  animism and anthropomorphism. In De rerum natu-
ra, he described the spirit as being « most clever » (prudentissimus) in all its 
performances, acting as a fully developed self.  On an even broader level, 
the programme of  explaining nature through itself  incurred in a funda-
mental contradiction : if  it is true that Telesio endowed nature with the 
power to justify and explain itself  (iuxta propria principia), so much so that 
even the human mind could be seen as a by-product of  nature, neverthe-
less, the way he characterised nature’s operations was too similar to the 
way one would have explained the actions of  human beings. If  this is the 
case, then we would have to agree with the classic objection put forward 
by Giovanni Gentile and Ernst Cassirer (for all their differences), i.e., that 
Telesio was unable to disentangle himself  from the persistent and insidi-
ous traps of  premodern animism.  Or maybe, what at first looks like a 
contradiction between a robust affirmation of  the autonomy of  nature 
and a tendency to subject nature to the dictates of  human consciousness 
is, in fact, a new way of  understanding knowledge, both the knowledge 
that nature has of  itself  and the knowledge that man has of  nature. Tele-
sio wrote on nature according to its principles, that is to say, not following 
his principles – meaning Telesio’s mind – and not even following her prin-
ciples, meaning nature as a personified agent. For Telesio, the point is not 
that natural beings act as human beings ; on the contrary, human beings 
act as natural beings even when they display the loftiest expressions of  
abstract thought or sublime deeds of  heroism.  Telesio’s aim was to dem-
onstrate that man, despite being endowed with the faculties of  intellect 
and will, remained an integral part of  the life of  nature. As Antonio Per-
sio pointed out correctly in his defence of  Telesio, the sentient power of  
 Telesio, Quod animal universum ab unica animae substantia gubernatur, in Varii de natura-
libus rebus libelli, cit., p. 216.
 According to Giovanni Gentile (Bernardino Telesio, now in I problemi della scolastica e il 
pensiero italiano (Opere, xii), Florence, Sansoni, 1963, p. 133-206), within the context of  the gen-
eral history of  philosophy, Telesio’s naturalism represented the initial stage in the history of  
human consciousness. According to Cassirer, Telesio’s tendency to empirical descriptions of  
nature could have become part of  the new scientific view of  nature if, instead of  falling back 
into animism « in its primitive forms », such a tendency had moved towards mathematical 
idealism (Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftli-
che Buchgeselleschaft, 1963, p. 156 ; Das Erkenntnisproblem, cit., i, pp. 232-240). On Cassirer’s 
reading of  Telesio, see G. Raio, Telesio e la filosofia della natura in Cassirer, in Bernardino Telesio 
e la cultura napoletana, cit., pp. 431-443.
 In Telesio’s view, heroic virtues, even the sacrifice of  one’s own life, have always a prag-
matic motive and they all fall within the universe’s tendency to self-preservation. Persio wri-
tes (Trattato dell’ingegno dell’huomo, cit., p. 34) : « sentiamo noi, perché sente egli [i.e., the ma-
terial spirit] ».
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nature, in charge of  the preservation of  the whole universe, has a broader 
scope than the soul. 
To recapitulate, we might say that Telesio’s notion of  sentience covers at 
least three distinct domains, and the precise assessment of  their relationships 
and differences is crucial for a proper understanding of  Telesio’s philoso-
phy. These domains correspond to the metaphysical, the ethico-physiologi-
cal and the epistemological aspects of  sentience (sensus). The metaphysical 
meaning of  sensus refers to the original discerning motions of  pursuit and 
avoidance manifested by the active natures, heat and cold.  The physiologi-
cal meaning of  sensus is related to the spirit’s ability to ‘sense’ its surround-
ing reality – the actual act of  sensation with all its psychological and ethi-
cal implications – and it has the certainty and immediacy that reason and 
intellect lack.  Finally, the epistemological meaning of  sensus derives from 
the view of  sense perception as a canon of  intelligibility and a paragon of  
sound knowledge.  Since the three domains – the metaphysical, the ethico-
physiological and the epistemological – represent three stages in the unfold-
ing of  one sentient power throughout the universe, man’s knowledge can 
be seen as a constant re-enactment of  the primordial sentience of  nature, 
while his ethical life stands out as a natural expression of  the spirit’s activity 
to adapt to the world. Sentience, the senses and sense knowledge are mani-
festations of  the same life of  nature, i.e., sensus.
 A. Persio, Apologia pro Bernardino Telesio adversus Franciscum Patritium, in Telesio, Varii 
de naturalibus rebus libelli, cit., pp. 476-477.
 Telesio, De rerum natura, iv, 2 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 8).
 Ibidem, vii, 1 (ed. De Franco, iii, p. 2) : « modus scilicet, quo rerum, quae universae externa 
nimirum specie internisque viribus in spiritum agunt, speciem naturamque et motus perci-
pit, quod sentire dicitur ».
 Ibidem, iv, 7 (ed. De Franco, ii, p. 28) : « quae intelliguntur, ex eorum similitudine intelli-
gantur oportet omnia, quae sensu percepta sunt ».
